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ABSTRACT 
 
The changing environment affects agriculture introducing sources of uncertainty. On the other hand, 
policies to cope with risks may have strong impacts on the environment. We evaluate the effects of public 
risk management programmes, such as subsidised crop insurance, fertilizer use and land allocation to 
crops. We implement a mathematical programming model of a representative wheat-tomato farm in 
Puglia, a southern Italy region. The results show that under the current crop insurance programmes, 
tomato productions are expected to expand and to require larger amount of fertilizer, whereas the opposite 
is true for wheat productions. Policy and environmental implications are discussed. 
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Environmental implications of crop insurance subsidies  
in Southern Italy  
 
Introduction 
Farm business is the sector of production for which factors outside the manager’s 
control most affect final outcomes. In particular agriculture is largely affected by 
weather fluctuations and climate changes [1]. These peculiarities have contributed to the 
development and acceptance of forms of public intervention aimed at reducing income 
variability that have no parallel in other sectors of the economy. In the United States, 
Canada and part of Europe, the attention of farmers and their representatives has 
focused on the potential offered by the involvement of governments in farm risk 
management programmes [2]. The environmental consequences of risk management 
policy, such as crop insurance, have been hotly debated [3-4]. In particular, the 
determinants of insuring decisions are still not clear cut. Moreover, whether or not the 
purchase of crop insurance induces farmers to reduce the use of potentially polluting 
chemical inputs (intensive margin), expanding the cultivated land (extensive margin) is 
an unresolved issue.  
On one hand, chemical and fertilizer applications may increase or decrease yield and  
profit variance. On the other hand, crop insurance subsidies, and higher levels of 
transfer payments are given to comparatively higher-risk areas of production, inducing 
risk-averse farmers to expand productions.  
In this framework, the Fischler reform represented a systematic attempt to reorient farm 
policy to place greater emphasis on environmental, landscape, food quality and animal 
welfare objectives. There are five key new elements in the reworked CAP framework; 
the introduction of decoupled payments, cross compliance, re-orientation of CAP 
support towards rural development policy by modulation, an audit system and new rural 
development measures. In this context, direct payments are conditional upon the respect 
of minimum environmental, animal welfare and food safety standards, and modulation 
of direct payments has been made compulsory, so that each Member State is forced to 
divert a (small) part of its direct payment endowments to the resources available for 
rural and regional development policies. The latest CAP reform acknowledged that 
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increased mobility and leisure time, added to the relocation of population towards rural 
areas, have all acted to increase the marginal value of environmental amenity.  
A new role has been attributed to the primary sector, namely production of 
environmental goods and food quality and safety. This new role may be explained in 
terms of multifunctionality, which means that agro-environmental policies promote 
non-commodity outputs jointly produced with agricultural commodity outputs [5].  
At the same time, the new regulations arising from Health Check confer management 
autonomy on Member States for the first time, authorised to use up to 10% of the 
national maximum plafond, to supply specific aid in clearly defined cases. Among 
specific subsidies (Measure d: insurance), there is the possibility of using the first pillar 
for subsidising measures to cover the risk of economic losses caused by adverse weather 
conditions and by animal or plant diseases or parasite infestation (Art.70, EC 
Regulation 73/2009). In actual fact, “Measure d” allows financial contributions to be 
granted for payment of crop insurance premiums up to a maximum of 65% of the total 
premium in the form of EU co-financing (absolutely new in the history of the CAP in 
this context). This co-financing cannot exceed 75% of the national financial 
contribution. 
In short, while both risk management and environmental policy have been specifically 
regulated, it remains unclear to date how such programmes might act together, without 
one offsetting the other.  
Hence the main objective of this investigation is to clarify the relationship between risk 
management policy and environmental policy in the context of farmers’ agrochemical 
applications and land use. To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt of its kind in 
Europe, and the results may well bring about a review of Government risk management 
programmes, which undoubtedly introduces potential distortion into farm-level 
decision-making which could be affected at both the intensive (input use) and extensive 
(land use) margins. There could be a knock-on effect in terms of rural and regional 
policy, which currently represents for southern Europe, i.e. Italy, the driving force of 
development.  
 
A large debate  on risk management and environmental policies 
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A vast literature focused on the potential environmental impacts of government-
sponsored risk management programmes such as subsidised crop insurance and crop 
disaster payments [6-9]. All such studies are limited to the United States. Since North 
America has experienced a long history of crop insurance, large datasets allow 
economists to consistently estimate crop insurance adoption patterns, chemical input use 
and crop acreage allocation. On the contrary, in Europe such data are unavailable, 
explaining why farmers’ behaviour under uncertainty has been underinvestigated. 
An underlying policy question is whether the benefits provided by government-
subsidised risk management programmes are offset by the costs of such programs, 
including the costs of unintended environmental effects, and whether or not risk 
management programmes could offset environmental programmes e.g. as predicted by 
Fischler’s reform. 
Understanding the impacts of chemical inputs is of crucial importance in environmental 
and economic science [10]. Pope and Kramer [11] modelled production risks analyzing 
their effects on input use. They consider a stochastic production function, under CRRA 
assumption, and modelled risk as function of input use. They show that risk-averse 
agents tend to use more (less) inputs able to decrease (increase) risks.  
Ahsan [12] investigated the relationship between crop insurance and input usage. They 
showed that full coverage crop insurance encourages investigate the relationship 
between crop insurance and input usage were: farmers choose inputs as if they were risk 
neutral. Quiggin [13] introduced the moral hazard problem: he found that crop 
insurance may lead to a reduction in input use. 
One of the most cited contributions is the paper by Horowitz and Lichtenberg [6]. They 
pointed out that in many instances pesticides are more accurately viewed as risk-
increasing. While the conventional wisdom is that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs, 
they found that their use may increase rather than decrease with crop insurance. Since 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s [6] contribution was based on data prior to 1992, hence 
before the Reform Act came into force in US in 1994, some aspects of farmer behaviour 
may have changed in the meantime. 
Smith and Goodwin [7] criticized Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s [6] findings that multiple 
peril crop insurance could force farmers to increase chemical input use. They 
emphasized the strong linkage between increase in expected yield and increase in yield 
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variance, if an input is considered as risk-increasing. The increase in variance positively 
affects the likelihood of an indemnity payment but the increase in mean yield offsets it. 
The net effect is ambiguous. Smith and Goodwin [7] doubted that the expected 
indemnity payment increased with input use for two reasons. First, chemical inputs 
increase production costs, and lower (increase) the expected profits (losses) when 
indemnity payments are made. Secondly, the critical yield that triggers an indemnity 
payment is determined by the farm’s yield history.  
Wu [9] found that crop insurance for corn in Nebraska caused a shift in production from 
hay and pasture to corn. In other words, crop insurance subsidies may also promote 
environmental degradation due to the increase in production which may result in 
increases in overall chemical use for crops. Importantly, this shift involves considering 
environmental externalities at the extensive and intensive margin. Wu [9] also pointed 
out that an increase in chemical application rates may be due to the ‘moral hazard’ 
created by crop insurance. 
 
The Italian crop insurance system 
In Italy, the Government’s involvement in agricultural risk management is based on the 
wholly state-financed National Solidarity Fund (FSN), set up in 1974 with two main 
objectives: to compensate farmers for damage due to natural disasters and support the 
use of crop insurance. State contribution has constantly increased in nominal terms, 
although this is mostly due to the increased share of combined perils policies that 
benefit from higher public subsidy to premiums (80%). Tariffs show a significant 
reduction between 2007 and 2011 (Table 1). 
 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
However, until recently, access to disaster payments was open to all farmers, 
irrespective of the signing of insurance contracts. From 1981 through 2005, 
appropriations by the FSN have totalized about €9.4 billion; 72% of the amount spent 
has been directed to disaster payments, while insurance subsidies have absorbed the 
remaining 28%. Over the same period, disaster payments averaged €234 million per 
year, reaching a maximum of €522 million in 1990. The Italian system of compensation 
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for natural disaster damage is mainly reactive, in the sense that the initial yearly 
endowment of funds received by the FSN can be integrated with ad hoc specific 
legislative measures, when necessary. In 2002, total appropriations for the FSN were 
€481 million. The law which established the FSN also authorized operation of farmers’ 
associations at the provincial level (Consorzi di Difesa) which were assigned two 
functions: (i) collection of farmers’ insurance demands (mainly for hail) and 
transferring them to the insurance companies; (ii) coordination and enforcement of 
common preventive measures. Despite subsidies of about 35% to 40% of actual 
premiums, the spread of insurance in Italian agriculture has been rather thin: the share 
of insured value on total crop production — mainly fruit crops and vineyards — has 
never exceeded 15%, reached in 1998 and decreasing in subsequent years. One likely 
reason is the possibility for Italian farmers to access compensation for natural disasters 
even without the signing of insurance policies. The Italian system has been modified in 
recent years with more emphasis on crop insurance, in an attempt to reduce the cost of 
ex-post compensation in the event of disasters. The main changes are the possibility for 
farmers to underwrite newly designed contracts for innovative multi-risk coverage 
directly with insurance companies, with premiums subsidised by up to 80%, and state-
supported reinsurance. Eligibility for indemnity shall be determined by an income loss, 
taking into account only income from agriculture which exceeds 30% of average gross 
income or the equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the same 
or similar schemes). Moreover, the amount of such payments shall compensate for less 
than 70 % of the producer’s income loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to 
receive this assistance.  
 
Theoretical model  
For our empirical investigation we used a non-linear programming model (NLP). We 
develop a model for farmers decision-making able to capture the strategies when 
deciding to enrol in the Environmental Program (EP) under uncertainty. Moreover, 
whether their participation strategies could be offset by risk management programs, 
such as crop insurance. 
In order to analyze the effects of the introduction of a subsidy on the premium of all-
risk insurance on yields, we used the Italian Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
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dataset of two samples of firms for the Apulia region. In particular, we considered 
wheat and tomato products to differentiate, in terms of expected variability of 
yields/revenue. Our analysis concerns two case studies of the same lowland/highland 
system.  
The choice of wheat and tomato is due to their different yield variability (tomato yields 
generally show higher variability than wheat) and to different production characteristics. 
The database is extracted from FADN-RICA and include 1092 farms, observed over the 
period from 2003 to 2008. Theoretically, farmers’ enrolment decisions in the EP mean 
dealing with various sources of uncertainty. The decision to participate in the EP must 
be made in the face of the well-known revenue uncertainty of agricultural production 
resulting from variability in output prices and crop yieldsi. Any expected utility model 
for risk-averse decision makers would suggest that subsidizing premiums would 
encourage farmers both to increase their level of production, and possibly increase it 
into riskier areas. The idea is that as a subsidy decreases, lower risk farmers would be 
less motivated to subscribe to crop insurance and riskier farmers could abandon their 
production (probably from marginal land).  
By modelling it, we could assume a multi-output firm with a fixed amount of land L* 
that can be allocated between j crops. The producer’s problem is to select levels of x 
variable inputs for each of the j crops in the production plan and to allocate L* hectares 
of land among these j crops. The modelled farmer is a price taker in the output and 
variable input markets. The farmer decides to subscribe an all risk (ARI) crop insurance 
contract guaranteeing yield losses up to 30% of average yield, with the following 
payoff:{Ij, Mj} = 1, …, I, where Ij represents the random (eventual) insurance indemnity 
and Mj is the non-random insurance premium for crop j. Moreover, at sowing time, the 
farmer could chooses to receive the environmental payments (decoupled payments), λ∈ 
{0, 1}, by comply his crop practice with the CAP’s rules.  We are assuming that crop 
insurance and input decisions are made simultaneously. This requires that the planning 
processes underlying both decisions occur simultaneously, which would appear a 
logical consequence of assuming that farmer decisions are affected by the overall 
economic environment, i.e. government risk management programmes and 
environmental payments.  
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At sowing time, total farm revenue Π is plausibly based on the expectation made on 
price, yield and costs experienced in the previous season, such that: E(piyi) = pieyie + 
cov (pieyie) - ci         (1) 
where E(·) is an expectation operator; ejp is the expected per quintal price of the jth 
crop; ejy  denotes the expected yield per hectare of the jth crop; cov (pj  yj) denotes the 
covariance between price and yield and underlines the natural hedging mechanism 
between price and yield; ci is the per hectare cost of production.  
Per hectare revenue for crop j and farmers I when crop insurance is subsidised and 
environmental payments occur is: 
piij = p’y’(xj) – cj – r’xj + ϑEPj + ∑i(Iij – Mij)                                 (2) 
where p' is the vector of the random price, y' represents the vector of the random crop 
yield per hectare as a function of the input levels xj, ci is the non-random variable cost, r 
is the price vector of inputs xj, and EP represents the environmental payments (where ϑ 
is an indicator variable for participation in the environmental program; ϑ = 1 if the 
farmer chooses to participate, 0 otherwise).  
Income per crop could be identified as ,jjS pi  where jS  is acreage planted to crop j, and 
total crop income pi is the sum of income over all crops: j
j
jS pipi ∑= . 
The representative farmer maximizes the expected utility of income, choosing the 
acreage allocation jS , input use jx , and participation in both environmental programme 
ϑ and insurance programme:  
                                         (3) 
The farmer’s utility function ( )•u  is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern [16] ( )0'',0' <> uu , 
under the hypothesis of risk aversion, such that 0/ 22 <∂∂ piU  (Pratt, 1964), and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA); ( )•F  identifies the joint distribution 
function of prices and yields.  
The optimal acreage allocation and input use for each crop ( jS  and jx  for all j), 
follows the constraints on acreage allocation 






≥ ∑
j
jSS . 
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In this way, as introduced by Seo et al. [8], the intensive margin effect of the availability 
of crop insurance and disaster payments for a crop could be identified with the 
difference in the optimal use of input jx  when the programme is available versus when 
it is not. Similarly, the extensive margin effect could be viewed as a change in optimal 
acreage jS  when the same programmes are available. 
In our analysis we use a direct expected utility maximizing non-linear programming 
(DEMP), combined with simulation approach. 
We utilized DEMP to maximize expected utility directly, by virtue of to using quadratic 
programming, recurring at Monte Carlo integration to simulate data mining from a 
sample of yield and price, under the hypothesis oh the distribution of these parameters. 
The approach allowed to estimate numerically the expected indemnity, in that the 
computation of the expected indemnity is unfeasible by using analytical approach. 
Farmer’s choice of the nitrogen fertilizer rate affect indirectly the mean and variance of 
the yield distribution. For this analysis, the functions for the dependence of the mean 
and variance of wheat and tomato yield on the nitrogen application rate were estimated 
using data from experiments conducted between 2003 and 2005 in Apulia region, 
Foggia province. Nitrogen fertilizer rates were experimentally varied from 0 to 300 q/ha 
and correspondently wheat and tomato yields has been measured for each plot for a total 
of 53 observations. A quadratic equation identifies the final result for mean and variance 
with all estimated coefficients significant at the 5% level. 
 
Empirical model 
We develop a solvable expected utility maximization model which is (a) free of 
restrictions on the forms of the utility function, and (b) free of assumptions regarding 
the distribution of the uncertain parameters.ii The underlying assumption in the model 
implies that wealth effects could affect production decisions. 
With negative exponential utility ( ( ) ( )cc θν −−= exp ), the DEMP objective function for 
problem (3) is:  
( )[ ]∑ −−
k
kRpiexp1 ,                 (4) 
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where k indexes each state (Monte Carlo random drawn), R is the coefficient of risk 
aversioniii, and jk
j
jk S pipi ∑=  is profit associated to the state k. Income from crop j in 
state k is:  
piijk = pk’y’k(xj) – cj – r’xj + ϑEPjk + ∑i(Iijk – Mijk)                                        (5) 
which differs from equation (2) in the index k that scored each random variable.  
In this context, the ARI insurance indemnities for any state k and crop j could be 
represented as:  






−= 0,max *
,,,
jkjjARIjARIjkARI yyCVGPEFI ,          (5a) 
where *jy  is the average yield used by ARI.  
Given that we set the model at only one trigger level, the non-random insurance 
premium for each crop does not depend, unlike in Seo et al. [8], on several coverage 
levels. This makes it easier to calculate the expected net indemnity which is equal to the 
expected indemnity minus the actual premium, and better represents the Italian crop 
insurance market.  
Since the integration required to obtain the expected indemnity is analytically 
intractable for the model, we used Monte Carlo integration. In agriculture, simulation 
models are routinely applied to biological system analysis (e.g., crop simulation or 
environmental models) and there is always some uncertainty present in the system, 
which can be modeled by sampling from appropriate probability distributions.  
Given that an integral can be approximated by computing the sample average of a set of 
function values, we  have interpreted the integral as an expected value. We then had to 
establish that the mean we were computing was finite. Our basic statistical result for the 
behaviour of sample means implies that, with a large enough sample, we can 
approximate the integral as closely as we like. The general approach is widely 
applicable in Bayesian econometrics and has begun to appear in classical statistics and 
econometrics as welliv. 
Consider the function ( ) ( ) ( )∫=
U
L
dxxgxfxF ,  where g(x) is a continuous function in the 
range [L, U], and suppose that g(x) is non-negative in the entire range. In order to 
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normalize the weighting function, we assume that ( )∫=
U
L
dxxgK ,  is a known constant. 
Then h(x)=g(x)/K is a probability function in the range because it satisfies the axioms of 
probability. Let ( ) ( )∫=
x
L
dtthxH .
 
Then H(L)=0, H(U)=1, H’(x)=h(x)>0, and so on.  
Then, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ ∫ ==
L
U
xh
U
L
xfKEdx
K
xg
xfKdxxgxf , where we use the notation 
( ) ( )[ ]xfKE xh  to denote the expected value of the function f(x) when x is drawn from the 
population with probability density function h(x). We assume that this expected value is 
a finite constantv. 
Thus the expected indemnity is the average indemnity for each policy over all states 
( )∑
k
ijijijk CVGPEFIk ,: . Since crop yields are known to fall in a range from 0 to some 
maximum possible value and their distribution can be significantly skewed either to the 
right or to the left and the beta distribution has such flexibility, we introduced into our 
analysis a random crop yield which follows a beta distribution, with mean and variance 
that depend on the dosage of applied nitrogen fertilizer. The model was solved using the 
non-linear program solver included in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System)vi. 
In particular, simulation for draw yields from the assumed distribution, and prices were 
carried out by Excel. The optimal fertilizer rate was determined as an integer variable 
by specifying fertilizer rates in 0.1 q/ha increments centered at the province mean for 
each crop; the fertilizer rate implied also the level of the mean and variance of the 
yields. GAMS interfaced with Excel by the GDXXRW program distributed with 
GAMS. GAMS sends the required means and variances to Excel, then Excel generates 
appropriately correlated yields and prices using the method of Richardson and Condra 
[14].  
 
Results  
To sum up, we have adopted a theoretical framework to model farmers’ choices. The 
model has been calibrated by mean of data collected from the FADN database. 
Successively, we have solved a mathematical programming model to compute optima 
farmers’ choices. The results are shown in Table 2. 
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With regard to the optimal fertilizer use and acreage allocation when the subsidized 
insurance program is available, unsurprisingly, we show that crop insurance generally 
has a positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both wheat and tomato. 
Depending on the crop and the farmer’s level of risk aversion, the optimal rate increases 
by about 5 q/ha. Crop insurance has a large effect on the optimal acreage allocation. 
When ARI is available, optimal tomato acreage almost doubles, accompanied by an 
appropriate decrease in wheat hectares.  
The results in table 2 also show that as farmer risk aversion increases, the optimal 
nitrogen rate decreases for all alternatives regardless of the crop because nitrogen is 
used as a risk-increasing input. In addition, optimal tomato acreage decreases and 
optimal wheat acreage increases, because tomato is the riskier crop. For the range of 
risk aversion levels explored, the optimal insurance coverage level slightly changed for 
tomato, but increased for wheat.  
In our study, crop insurance positively affected both crops at the intensive margin. It 
would be inappropriate to compare our results with others reached in the past due to the 
different areas investigated.  
Regardless of yield distribution, when crop insurance is available, farmers find it 
optimal to bear more risk and so choose fertilizer rates accordingly. Given our 
conditional yield distributions, this means an increase in the fertilizer rate. Once again, 
since our analysis was conducted in a different scenario, it would be prudent to avoid 
comparing it to others carried out in the past.  
 
< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Conclusion 
The environmental impact of farming continues to play a significant role in policy 
debates over the role of government in the agricultural sector of the economy. Some 
experts have argued that government policies aimed at reducing production risks may 
create potential incentives to undertake activities harmful to the environment. In other 
terms, agricultural subsidies may induce a hazardous behaviours. For example, the 
provision of state-subsidised crop insurance may encourage producers to bring 
economically marginal land into production: if this land is more environmentally fragile 
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than land already farmed, this reduction in risk provided by state-subsidised crop 
insurance could lead to a reduction in environmental quality. In addition to crop 
insurance, the government has set up a myriad of other programmes designed, among 
other things, to provide income support and reduce income variability in the agricultural 
sector. Some of these programme payments are linked to the current production of a 
particular crop, while other programme payments are decoupled from current 
production.  
While such programmes provide incentives to expand production on the extensive 
margin, they may also lead to reductions in environmental amenity and prejudice 
multifunctionality objectives. In addition to encouraging production on environmentally 
fragile land, farm subsidies and risk management policies provide incentives for 
producers to alter their crop mix, cropping practices (including input use) and 
conservation practices.  
Unsurprisingly, the results of our investigation show that crop insurance generally has a 
positive effect on the optimal nitrogen fertilizer rate for both crops under consideration. 
Crop insurance has a major effect on the optimal acreage allocation for both crops 
considered and positively affected both crops at the intensive margin level. The results 
are in line with conventional wisdom [6-7]. Moreover, when crop insurance is available, 
farmers find it optimal to bear more risk [15]; hence they would choose fertilizer rates 
accordingly which, given our conditional yield distributions, would mean an increase in 
the fertilizer rate.  
Although it would be prudent to avoid comparing our analysis to others carried out 
previously, it would appear clear that agricultural policy, and more specifically 
insurance subsidies, has the potential to alter land use, cropping practices and 
conservation practices, and may contribute to increases in soil erosion [16].  
Moreover, it would seem that subsidising premiums could offset the benefits of 
environmental programmes, as foreseen by Fischler's reform of Europe's agricultural 
support system. In this sense, Government risk management programmes undoubtedly 
introduce potential distortion into farm-level decision-making which affect both the 
intensive (input use) and extensive (land use) margins. Southern regions in Europe, such 
as Puglia, which are greatly affected by regional development policy, could see their 
future patterns of development jeopardized. Finally it is worth noting that these results 
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are of great interest also for Mediterranean Countries [17-18], lacking of policies for 
risk coping and characterized by similar farming systems to those observed in Southern 
Italy. Understanding how policymakers should plan efficient policies for risk 
management is a promising area of research. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 For clarity’s sake, consider two farmers who farm in different regions. For unsubsidized insurance one 
farmer would pay £10 per £100 of liability; the other £20 per £100 of liability for the same insurance 
policy. In relative risk terms, the farmer paying £20 would have yields that are twice as risky for the same 
insurance policy. Given a 50 percent subsidy, the lower risk farmer receives a £5 per £100 of liability 
transfer and the higher risk farmer receives £10. 
ii
 In Lambert, D.K. and McCarl B., 1985. “Risk Modeling Using Direct Solution of Nonlinear 
Approximations of the Utility Function”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67 (4), p.847. 
iii
 Values for R were chosen in accordance with the previous investigation carried out on the effects of the 
public subsidy at premium. In particular R=1 has been selected for low risk-aversion, and R=3 for high 
risk-aversion.  
iv
 Used to estimate numerically the expected indemnity, Greene pp. 181-183. 
v
 Used to estimate numerically the expected indemnity, Greene pp. 181-183. 
vi
 Using the method of Richardson and Condra, as suggested from McCarl and Seo et al. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Crop insurance market in Italy (2004-2011) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Certificates n° 212231 212445 211444 236922 264698 226177 208204 207762 
Insured quantities .000 t 14894 14837 14805 16329 20416 18218 20090 19872 
Insured hectares .000 ha 982 1074 1125 1051 1450 1355 1153 1164 
Insured Value .000€ 3710212 3810222 3789132 4379809 5436140 5131045 5312829 6145146 
Total Premiums collected  (TP) .000€ 177.439 269124 265033 292888 338059 317210 285502 287461 
Indemnities (VR) .000€ 152165 159984 149975 184626 272711 234781 169259 171534 
Public Contribution * % 56.80 65.90 66.62 66.78 66.34 67 66.41 66.12 
Average tarifs % 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.22 6.75 6.70 5.78 5.74 
VR/TP % 66.2 59.6 55.4 64 81 75 60 58 
(*)premiums/insured value 
Source: Ismea 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Farmer’s choices under different scenarios 
 Tomato Wheat 
 Low risk-aversion High risk-aversion Low risk-aversion High risk-aversion 
 Selected nitrogen fertilizer rate (tonn/ha)  
Government programme  
Environmental Program 12.36 11.99 7.15 7.02 
All risk and Environmental Program 12.88 12.51 7.63 7.49 
     
 Selected acreage allocation (ha) 
Government programme  
Environmental Program 0.99 0.78 2.45 3.15 
All risk and Environmental Program 1.49 1.27 2.11 2.87 
The coefficients of absolute risk aversion are 4.0 x 10-6 and 7.0 x 10-6 for moderately and highly risk averse, respectively. 
 
 
